

SECRET


26 August 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Executive and Planning Division

THROUGH : Deputy Director of Security  
for Personnel Security

SUBJECT : Office of Security Significant  
Accomplishments - FY 1970


1. In accordance with your request the following items are suggested for inclusion in Subject report to the DDS as the significant accomplishments of the Personnel Security Division:



25X1

B. Personnel Security Program for Non-Staff  
Individuals in Agency Installations: This Program was designed to tighten security controls over those individuals operating at the Top Secret level at various Agency installations. Review of pertinent files has been accomplished and certain cases have been placed under

SECRET



~~SECRET~~

the Agency Reinvestigation Program. These cases include Consultants, Private Contractors, Char Force, General Services Administration, Government Services Incorporated employees, Contract Type A (Internal) employees, and Industrial Contractor's employees. This Program can now be considered an accomplished fact and fully on-line.

C. Polygraph Program for Contractor's Employees:

The past year has shown an increase in the use of Contractor's employees in the Headquarters Building and also in other buildings in the Headquarters area. This increase was brought to the attention of the [ ] committee, who had been studying the various phases of the security of Headquarters Building. It was pointed out to the committee, who in turn brought it to the attention of the Director of Logistics, that Contractor's employees who are cleared Top Secret and have Staff-like access to the Headquarters complex require a polygraph examination as a part of their processing. They are granted an Industrial Security Staff Approval at the Top Secret level (ISSA/TS). New procedures have been instituted which require that the Director of Logistics personally approve each and every new contract that will require the Contractor's employee to be polygraphed. This procedure was deemed necessary in view of the current climate in Congress and elsewhere regarding the invasion of a person's privacy and the rights of individuals regarding the use of the polygraph. The Security Staff, Office of Logistics, visits the Contractor facility, briefs a senior company official of the polygraph requirement and obtains permission from the company to polygraph their personnel.

25X1

D. Foreign Divorces: With regard to concern expressed by Office of Personnel, this Division now affords OP the names of employees who have obtained a foreign divorce or who had a spouse who may have obtained such a divorce. In order to protect the rights of the employee and their dependents, OP advises the employee that a problem may exist which could possibly involve death benefits, insurance benefits and retirement benefits due his dependents and heirs. It is then up to the individual employee to satisfy himself that all is in order. It is noted that on 17 June 1970 OP issued [ ] [ ] entitled "Unfavorable Consequences of a Mexican Divorce".

25X1

E. Security Coordination with Medical and Personnel Staffs: Within the past year there has been a continued increase in the amount of information developed by the

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Office of Security in the area of overall suitability, both in relation to applicants as well as old line employees. This particularly applies to increased evidence of dope usage by applicants. As a result of this problem, there is an important and beneficial trend towards a greater degree of interchange of information between Security, Medical, and Personnel representatives. This continuing informal exchange dovetails with and otherwise supplements the formal presentation of cases to the Applicant Review Panel (ARP) and the Personnel Evaluation Board (PEB).

25X1 F. Staff and Contract Employees Assigned Overseas: Beginning in FY 1969 policy agreements were established with the Clandestine Services guaranteeing that Staff-like access for Contract personnel will only go to those employees who meet Staff standards. Likewise, when Security records reveal that an Agency employee has been identified in the press media, this data is passed to the Counter-Intelligence Staff before the individual departs for overseas. Increased emphasis has also been placed on [ ] briefings. It is noted that these agreements have proven most successful. Various components have requested advice on the clearability of individuals being considered for assignments prior to processing thus avoiding later conflicts.

25X1 G. Redraft [ ] "Limitations on Outside Activities". While this was accomplished in FY 1969, the most significant change related to speeches and publications on subject matters clearly unrelated to foreign intelligence, national security, Agency activities, or matters that could not be construed as official Agency or U.S. Government policy. Such speeches and publications no longer receive prior approval. Further, in those cases which require prior approval the final approving authority is the appropriate Deputy Director or the Executive Director-Comptroller for the requests which originate in independent offices.

25X1 H. Revised [ ] "Risk of Hijacking in Commercial Air Travel", to provide employees with the benefit of hijacking experiences and guidance related to this threat. This has proven quite successful in that to date there have been no embarrassing situations encountered.

SECRET

SECRET

I. Expanded and refined liaison with other U.S. Government agencies in the area of "crank" mail. This program has facilitated the handling of such material, and it has been particularly effective in those cases which reflect actual or potential threats to White House or other U.S. Governmental officials.

25X1 J. Issued [ ] "Federal Census", initiated inquiries with Bureau of the Census which set forth instructions and guidance for the benefit of both domestic and overseas employees in completing their questionnaires. The effectiveness of the issuances is considered successful due to the dearth of inquiries received.

2. The Personnel Security Division in FY 1970 received and processed:

25X1 [ ] Staff Applicant Cases  
Other Field Investigation Type Cases  
Industrial Security Cases  
Contact Cases  
Facility Access Authorization Cases  
Clearance Certifications  
Transfer & Reassignment Actions  
Special Clearance Actions

3. Fuller details on any of the above items can be obtained from the undersigned.

25X1

[ ]  
Chief, Personnel Security Division

SECRET

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP83B00823R00040017-5

UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

# OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	Executive Officer		
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			

ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE

## Remarks:

Attached are the Personnel Security Directorate's contributions to the report regarding Significant A accomplishments FY 1970

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.

DATE

SA/DDS/PS

4E-58

8/27/70

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP83B00823R00040017-5